Abstract
In contrast to other well-known cognitive models of moral decision-making, social cognitive theory posits that individuals can disengage from their own moral standards thereby allowing themselves to commit immoral acts. While previous research largely supports the general premise of moral disengagement, we suggest that direct tests of moral disengagement processes and the commensurate diminished role of moral knowledge are conspicuously absent. In five studies, we use multiple methods to capture both knowledge of the immorality of an act and theorized in situ processes of moral disengagement. Ultimately, we find no evidence of the proposed processes associated with moral disengagement. Furthermore, our data suggests that moral knowledge is a key driver of moral behavior in everyday situations and is not easily set aside. We conclude by discussing the implications of this research for theory and practice.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 124-137 |
| Number of pages | 14 |
| Journal | Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes |
| Volume | 123 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Mar 1 2014 |
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All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Applied Psychology
- Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management
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The role of moral knowledge in everyday immorality : What does it matter if I know what is right? / Reynolds, Scott J.; Dang, Carolyn; Yam, Kai Chi; Leavitt, Keith.
In: Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Vol. 123, No. 2, 01.03.2014, p. 124-137.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
TY - JOUR
T1 - The role of moral knowledge in everyday immorality
T2 - What does it matter if I know what is right?
AU - Reynolds, Scott J.
AU - Dang, Carolyn
AU - Yam, Kai Chi
AU - Leavitt, Keith
PY - 2014/3/1
Y1 - 2014/3/1
N2 - In contrast to other well-known cognitive models of moral decision-making, social cognitive theory posits that individuals can disengage from their own moral standards thereby allowing themselves to commit immoral acts. While previous research largely supports the general premise of moral disengagement, we suggest that direct tests of moral disengagement processes and the commensurate diminished role of moral knowledge are conspicuously absent. In five studies, we use multiple methods to capture both knowledge of the immorality of an act and theorized in situ processes of moral disengagement. Ultimately, we find no evidence of the proposed processes associated with moral disengagement. Furthermore, our data suggests that moral knowledge is a key driver of moral behavior in everyday situations and is not easily set aside. We conclude by discussing the implications of this research for theory and practice.
AB - In contrast to other well-known cognitive models of moral decision-making, social cognitive theory posits that individuals can disengage from their own moral standards thereby allowing themselves to commit immoral acts. While previous research largely supports the general premise of moral disengagement, we suggest that direct tests of moral disengagement processes and the commensurate diminished role of moral knowledge are conspicuously absent. In five studies, we use multiple methods to capture both knowledge of the immorality of an act and theorized in situ processes of moral disengagement. Ultimately, we find no evidence of the proposed processes associated with moral disengagement. Furthermore, our data suggests that moral knowledge is a key driver of moral behavior in everyday situations and is not easily set aside. We conclude by discussing the implications of this research for theory and practice.
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UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84892754245&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.obhdp.2013.10.008
DO - 10.1016/j.obhdp.2013.10.008
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84892754245
VL - 123
SP - 124
EP - 137
JO - Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes
JF - Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes
SN - 0749-5978
IS - 2
ER -