The role of power and politics in the repricing of executive options

Timothy G. Pollock, Harald M. Fischer, James B. Wade

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

80 Scopus citations

Abstract

We explore how CEO power affects the repricing of executive options. The spread between an option's exercise, or strike, price, and the market value of a stock impacts the likelihood of repricing. This effect is enhanced when the CEO of the firm in question is also the chairman of its board. Firm and CEO visibility, more board members appointed after a CEO's hiring than before it, a staggered board, and relatively high percentages of CEO and institutional ownership reduce the impact of the spread on the likelihood of repricing.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1172-1182
Number of pages11
JournalAcademy of Management Journal
Volume45
Issue number6
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 2002

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All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Business and International Management
  • Business, Management and Accounting(all)
  • Strategy and Management
  • Management of Technology and Innovation

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