Three Problems in Learning Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibria

James Schuyler Jordan

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

108 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper discusses three problems that can prevent the convergence of learning mechanisms to mixed-strategy Nash equilibria. First, while players′ expectations may converge to a mixed equilibrium, the strategies played typically fail to converge. Second, even in 2 × 2 games, fictitious play can produce a sequence of frequency distributions in which the marginal frequencies converge to equilibrium mixed strategies but the joint frequencies violate independence. Third, in a three-player matching-pennies game with a unique equilibrium, it is shown that if players learn as Bayesian statisticians then the equilibrium is locally unstable. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C73, D83.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)368-386
Number of pages19
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume5
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 1993

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Nash equilibrium
Mixed strategy
Mixed equilibrium
Fictitious play
Mixed strategy equilibrium
Economics

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

Jordan, James Schuyler. / Three Problems in Learning Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibria. In: Games and Economic Behavior. 1993 ; Vol. 5, No. 3. pp. 368-386.
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Three Problems in Learning Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibria. / Jordan, James Schuyler.

In: Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 5, No. 3, 01.01.1993, p. 368-386.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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