Throughput maximizing games in the two-hop relay channel with energy cooperation

Burak Varan, Aylin Yener

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

    2 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    In this paper, we study a two-hop network where the source and the relay have data that the destination wishes to receive. The source node is not directly connected to the destination; it can send its data only via the relay. The relay node, on the other hand, does not have an external source of energy, and needs to perform RF energy harvesting from the source to send its and the source's data. Both nodes wish to send as much of their data to the destination as possible. For this setup, we first formulate a noncooperative game and improve upon its equilibrium by using a pricing scheme. Next, we model the communication setup as a Stackelberg game with the relay node as the leader and the source node as the follower of the game. We analyze the resulting equilibrium and interpret how the leader of the game chooses its strategy in order to influence the follower's decision. We provide numerical examples which compare the payoffs achieved by these equilibria. We investigate the impact of the model parameters on the decisions of the two players and the achieved payoffs. We observe that at the Stackelberg equilibrium, the leader of the game can manipulate the follower in order to achieve a higher payoff than it would at the social optimum.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Title of host publication2015 49th Annual Conference on Information Sciences and Systems, CISS 2015
    PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
    ISBN (Electronic)9781479984282
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Apr 15 2015
    Event2015 49th Annual Conference on Information Sciences and Systems, CISS 2015 - Baltimore, United States
    Duration: Mar 18 2015Mar 20 2015

    Publication series

    Name2015 49th Annual Conference on Information Sciences and Systems, CISS 2015

    Other

    Other2015 49th Annual Conference on Information Sciences and Systems, CISS 2015
    CountryUnited States
    CityBaltimore
    Period3/18/153/20/15

    Fingerprint

    Throughput
    Energy harvesting
    Communication
    Costs

    All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

    • Information Systems

    Cite this

    Varan, B., & Yener, A. (2015). Throughput maximizing games in the two-hop relay channel with energy cooperation. In 2015 49th Annual Conference on Information Sciences and Systems, CISS 2015 [7086885] (2015 49th Annual Conference on Information Sciences and Systems, CISS 2015). Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.. https://doi.org/10.1109/CISS.2015.7086885
    Varan, Burak ; Yener, Aylin. / Throughput maximizing games in the two-hop relay channel with energy cooperation. 2015 49th Annual Conference on Information Sciences and Systems, CISS 2015. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2015. (2015 49th Annual Conference on Information Sciences and Systems, CISS 2015).
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    Varan, B & Yener, A 2015, Throughput maximizing games in the two-hop relay channel with energy cooperation. in 2015 49th Annual Conference on Information Sciences and Systems, CISS 2015., 7086885, 2015 49th Annual Conference on Information Sciences and Systems, CISS 2015, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2015 49th Annual Conference on Information Sciences and Systems, CISS 2015, Baltimore, United States, 3/18/15. https://doi.org/10.1109/CISS.2015.7086885

    Throughput maximizing games in the two-hop relay channel with energy cooperation. / Varan, Burak; Yener, Aylin.

    2015 49th Annual Conference on Information Sciences and Systems, CISS 2015. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2015. 7086885 (2015 49th Annual Conference on Information Sciences and Systems, CISS 2015).

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

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    Varan B, Yener A. Throughput maximizing games in the two-hop relay channel with energy cooperation. In 2015 49th Annual Conference on Information Sciences and Systems, CISS 2015. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. 2015. 7086885. (2015 49th Annual Conference on Information Sciences and Systems, CISS 2015). https://doi.org/10.1109/CISS.2015.7086885