Time-optimized and truthful dynamic spectrum rental mechanism

Shabnam Sodagari, Alireza Attar, Victor C M Leung, Sven G. Bilen

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The process of admitting secondary spectrum users via spectrum auctions provides a convenient framework for the primary license holder to control utilization of its idle resources. While most existing solutions in the literature are static, offline auction mechanisms, the dynamics of arrival and departure of secondary bidders, as well as the uncertainty of availability of a given sub-channel for leasing in future, calls for novel auction strategies. In this paper we propose a dynamic, online auction design that addresses two key issues. First, we determine optimal auction instances so as to maximize the profitability of this auction model. Further, by utilizing critical pricing strategy, the incentive of bidding secondaries to misreport their price, time of arrival, and departure is alleviated and hence a truthful, profitable auction results. Our numerical results verify the profitability of this dynamic auction as compared with static Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auctions with fixed auction time.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication2010 IEEE 72nd Vehicular Technology Conference Fall, VTC2010-Fall - Proceedings
DOIs
StatePublished - 2010
Event2010 IEEE 72nd Vehicular Technology Conference Fall, VTC2010-Fall - Ottawa, ON, Canada
Duration: Sep 6 2010Sep 9 2010

Other

Other2010 IEEE 72nd Vehicular Technology Conference Fall, VTC2010-Fall
CountryCanada
CityOttawa, ON
Period9/6/109/9/10

Fingerprint

Auctions
Profitability
Availability
Online Auctions
Costs
Time of Arrival
Bidding
Incentives
Pricing
Maximise
Verify
Uncertainty
Numerical Results
Resources

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering
  • Computer Science Applications
  • Applied Mathematics

Cite this

Sodagari, S., Attar, A., Leung, V. C. M., & Bilen, S. G. (2010). Time-optimized and truthful dynamic spectrum rental mechanism. In 2010 IEEE 72nd Vehicular Technology Conference Fall, VTC2010-Fall - Proceedings [5594298] https://doi.org/10.1109/VETECF.2010.5594298
Sodagari, Shabnam ; Attar, Alireza ; Leung, Victor C M ; Bilen, Sven G. / Time-optimized and truthful dynamic spectrum rental mechanism. 2010 IEEE 72nd Vehicular Technology Conference Fall, VTC2010-Fall - Proceedings. 2010.
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Sodagari, S, Attar, A, Leung, VCM & Bilen, SG 2010, Time-optimized and truthful dynamic spectrum rental mechanism. in 2010 IEEE 72nd Vehicular Technology Conference Fall, VTC2010-Fall - Proceedings., 5594298, 2010 IEEE 72nd Vehicular Technology Conference Fall, VTC2010-Fall, Ottawa, ON, Canada, 9/6/10. https://doi.org/10.1109/VETECF.2010.5594298

Time-optimized and truthful dynamic spectrum rental mechanism. / Sodagari, Shabnam; Attar, Alireza; Leung, Victor C M; Bilen, Sven G.

2010 IEEE 72nd Vehicular Technology Conference Fall, VTC2010-Fall - Proceedings. 2010. 5594298.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

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Sodagari S, Attar A, Leung VCM, Bilen SG. Time-optimized and truthful dynamic spectrum rental mechanism. In 2010 IEEE 72nd Vehicular Technology Conference Fall, VTC2010-Fall - Proceedings. 2010. 5594298 https://doi.org/10.1109/VETECF.2010.5594298