To invest or insure? How authoritarian time horizons impact foreign aid effectiveness

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

65 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In this article, the author argues that the time horizon a dictator faces affects his incentives over the use of aid in three ways. First, dictators have a greater incentive to invest in public goods when they have a long time horizon. Second, dictators with short time horizons often face the threat of challengers to the regime; this leads them to forgo investment and instead consume state resources in two forms that harm growth: repression and private pay-offs to political opponents. Third, dictators with short time horizons have a strong incentive to secure personal wealth as a form of insurance in case the regime falls. Using panel data on dictatorships in 71 developing countries from 1961 to 2001, the author finds that time horizons have a positive impact on aid effectiveness: Foreign aid is associated with positive growth when dictators face long time horizons and negative growth when time horizons are short.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)971-1000
Number of pages30
JournalComparative Political Studies
Volume41
Issue number7
DOIs
StatePublished - Jul 1 2008

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incentive
regime
dictatorship
repression
time
insurance
developing country
threat
resources

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Sociology and Political Science

Cite this

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To invest or insure? How authoritarian time horizons impact foreign aid effectiveness. / Wright, Joseph.

In: Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 41, No. 7, 01.07.2008, p. 971-1000.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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