Tracking anonymous sinks in wireless sensor networks

Elhadi M. Shakshuki, Tarek R. Sheltami, Nan Kang, Xinyu Xing

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

5 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Nowadays, wireless sensor networks are deployed in a wide range of applications such as military. To enable sinks to avoid physical attacks from adversaries, most of WSNs adopt sink-location privacy mechanisms. By utilizing these mechanisms, an adversary cannot analyze packet traffic and perform hop-byhop trace-back, and thus deduce the location of a sink. In this paper, we propose an attack approach to track anonymous sinks. It utilizes a Pseudo-Noise (PN) code to mark a data flow in an invisible manner. An adversary is able to interfere with a source node's traffic by embedding a secure signal into the node's traffic. The signal is carried along with the traffic from the source node to the sink. Therefore, the attacker can recognize the location of a sink node by tracking the invisible secure signal. Through our simulation experiments, we conclude that the proposed attack approach is able to track an anonymous sink without additional traffic overhead.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationProceedings - 2009 International Conference on Advanced Information Networking and Applications, AINA 2009
Pages510-516
Number of pages7
DOIs
StatePublished - Oct 5 2009
Event2009 International Conference on Advanced Information Networking and Applications, AINA 2009 - Bradford, United Kingdom
Duration: May 26 2009May 29 2009

Publication series

NameProceedings - International Conference on Advanced Information Networking and Applications, AINA
ISSN (Print)1550-445X

Other

Other2009 International Conference on Advanced Information Networking and Applications, AINA 2009
CountryUnited Kingdom
CityBradford
Period5/26/095/29/09

Fingerprint

Wireless sensor networks
Experiments

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Engineering(all)

Cite this

Shakshuki, E. M., Sheltami, T. R., Kang, N., & Xing, X. (2009). Tracking anonymous sinks in wireless sensor networks. In Proceedings - 2009 International Conference on Advanced Information Networking and Applications, AINA 2009 (pp. 510-516). [5076241] (Proceedings - International Conference on Advanced Information Networking and Applications, AINA). https://doi.org/10.1109/AINA.2009.61
Shakshuki, Elhadi M. ; Sheltami, Tarek R. ; Kang, Nan ; Xing, Xinyu. / Tracking anonymous sinks in wireless sensor networks. Proceedings - 2009 International Conference on Advanced Information Networking and Applications, AINA 2009. 2009. pp. 510-516 (Proceedings - International Conference on Advanced Information Networking and Applications, AINA).
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Shakshuki, EM, Sheltami, TR, Kang, N & Xing, X 2009, Tracking anonymous sinks in wireless sensor networks. in Proceedings - 2009 International Conference on Advanced Information Networking and Applications, AINA 2009., 5076241, Proceedings - International Conference on Advanced Information Networking and Applications, AINA, pp. 510-516, 2009 International Conference on Advanced Information Networking and Applications, AINA 2009, Bradford, United Kingdom, 5/26/09. https://doi.org/10.1109/AINA.2009.61

Tracking anonymous sinks in wireless sensor networks. / Shakshuki, Elhadi M.; Sheltami, Tarek R.; Kang, Nan; Xing, Xinyu.

Proceedings - 2009 International Conference on Advanced Information Networking and Applications, AINA 2009. 2009. p. 510-516 5076241 (Proceedings - International Conference on Advanced Information Networking and Applications, AINA).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

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Shakshuki EM, Sheltami TR, Kang N, Xing X. Tracking anonymous sinks in wireless sensor networks. In Proceedings - 2009 International Conference on Advanced Information Networking and Applications, AINA 2009. 2009. p. 510-516. 5076241. (Proceedings - International Conference on Advanced Information Networking and Applications, AINA). https://doi.org/10.1109/AINA.2009.61