Trading public goods stabilizes interspecific mutualism

Marco Archetti, István Scheuring

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

11 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The existence of cooperation between species raises a fundamental problem for evolutionary theory. Why provide costly services to another species if the feedback of this provision also happens to benefit intra-specific competitors that provide no service? Rewarding cooperators and punishing defectors can help maintain mutualism; this is not possible, however, when one can only respond to the collective action of one's partners, which is likely to be the case in many common symbioses. We show how the theory of public goods can explain the stability of mutualism when discrimination between cooperators and defectors is not possible: if two groups of individuals trade goods that are non-linear, increasing functions of the number of contributions, their mutualistic interaction is maintained by the exchange of these public goods, even when it is not possible to punish defectors, which can persist at relatively high frequencies. This provides a theoretical justification and testable predictions for the evolution of mutualism in the absence of discrimination mechanisms.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)58-67
Number of pages10
JournalJournal of Theoretical Biology
Volume318
DOIs
StatePublished - Feb 7 2013

Fingerprint

Mutualism
Symbiosis
mutualism
Feedback
Discrimination
collective action
Increasing Functions
Justification
symbiosis
Likely
prediction
Prediction
Interaction

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Statistics and Probability
  • Modeling and Simulation
  • Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology(all)
  • Immunology and Microbiology(all)
  • Agricultural and Biological Sciences(all)
  • Applied Mathematics

Cite this

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Trading public goods stabilizes interspecific mutualism. / Archetti, Marco; Scheuring, István.

In: Journal of Theoretical Biology, Vol. 318, 07.02.2013, p. 58-67.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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