TY - JOUR
T1 - TRENDS
T2 - The Supreme Court’s (Surprising?) Indifference to Public Opinion
AU - Johnson, Ben
AU - Strother, Logan
N1 - Funding Information:
We thank John Kastellec, Eric Waltenburg, Matt Hall, Peter Enns, Jay McCann, Leigh Raymond, Giancarlo Visconti, Michael Nelson, Brandon Bartels, Matt Hitt, panel participants at APSA (American Political Science Association) 2018 and APSA 2019, and the anonymous reviewers for helpful comments and suggestions on previous drafts, and Keith Bybee for suggesting the title. Finally, we thank Amanda Bryan, Isaac Unah, and Todd Collins for sharing replication materials. A previous version of this paper received the award for 2020 Best Conference Paper for the Law and Courts Section of the APSA. The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2020 University of Utah.
PY - 2021/3
Y1 - 2021/3
N2 - Does the Supreme Court care what the public thinks? For decades, published articles have consistently reported a significant, positive relationship between public opinion and Supreme Court output. However, these studies posit mutually contradictory theories and report irreconcilable results. We advance this literature in two ways. First, we show that the empirical “fact” driving the search for a workable theory is actually illusory. Second, we defend a theory of judicial independence. To be clear, we do not attempt to prove the Court does not respond to the public’s opinions on policy. We argue that there is little reason the Court should respond and demonstrate that, contrary to twenty-five years of scholarship, there is no good empirical evidence suggesting it does.
AB - Does the Supreme Court care what the public thinks? For decades, published articles have consistently reported a significant, positive relationship between public opinion and Supreme Court output. However, these studies posit mutually contradictory theories and report irreconcilable results. We advance this literature in two ways. First, we show that the empirical “fact” driving the search for a workable theory is actually illusory. Second, we defend a theory of judicial independence. To be clear, we do not attempt to prove the Court does not respond to the public’s opinions on policy. We argue that there is little reason the Court should respond and demonstrate that, contrary to twenty-five years of scholarship, there is no good empirical evidence suggesting it does.
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U2 - 10.1177/1065912920958080
DO - 10.1177/1065912920958080
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85091155074
SN - 1065-9129
VL - 74
SP - 18
EP - 34
JO - Political Research Quarterly
JF - Political Research Quarterly
IS - 1
ER -