Using signaling games to model the multi-step attack-defense scenarios on confidentiality

Jingqiang Lin, Peng Liu, Jiwu Jing

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

18 Scopus citations

Abstract

In the multi-step attack-defense scenarios (MSADSs), each rational player (the attacker or the defender) tries to maximize his payoff, but the uncertainty about his opponent prevents him from taking the suitable actions. The defender doesn't know the attacker's target list, and may deploy unnecessary but costly defenses to protect machines not in the target list. Similarly, the attacker doesn't know the deployed protections, and may spend lots of time and effort on a well-protected machine. We develop a repeated two-way signaling game to model the MSADSs on confidentiality, and show how to find the actions maximizing the expected payoffs through the equilibrium. In the proposed model, on receiving each intrusion detection system alert (i.e., a signal), the defender follows the equilibrium to gradually reduce the uncertainty about the attacker's targets and calculate the defenses maximizing his expected payoff.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationDecision and Game Theory for Security - Third International Conference, GameSec 2012, Proceedings
Pages118-137
Number of pages20
DOIs
StatePublished - Nov 26 2012
Event3rd International Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security, GameSec 2012 - Budapest, Hungary
Duration: Nov 5 2012Nov 6 2012

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume7638 LNCS
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Other

Other3rd International Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security, GameSec 2012
CountryHungary
CityBudapest
Period11/5/1211/6/12

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Theoretical Computer Science
  • Computer Science(all)

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