Voluntary voting: Costs and benefits

Vijay Krishna, John Morgan

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

24 Scopus citations

Abstract

We compare voluntary and compulsory voting in a Condorcet-type model in which voters have identical preferences but differential information. With voluntary voting, all equilibria involve sincere voting and positive participation. Thus, in contrast to situations with compulsory voting, there is no conflict between strategic and sincere behavior. When voting is costless, voluntary voting is welfare superior to compulsory voting. Even when voting is costly, participation rates are such that, in the limit, the correct candidate is elected-that is, information fully aggregates. Because it economizes on costs, voluntary voting is again welfare superior to compulsory voting.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)2083-2123
Number of pages41
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume147
Issue number6
DOIs
StatePublished - Nov 1 2012

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics

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