TY - JOUR
T1 - Voluntary voting
T2 - Costs and benefits
AU - Krishna, Vijay
AU - Morgan, John
N1 - Funding Information:
This research was supported by a grant from the National Science Foundation ( SES-0452015 ) and the Human Capital Foundation . It was completed, in part, while the first author was a Deutsche Bank Member at the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton. The referees provided many helpful suggestions. We owe special thanks to Roger Myerson for introducing us to the wonders of Poisson games.
PY - 2012/11
Y1 - 2012/11
N2 - We compare voluntary and compulsory voting in a Condorcet-type model in which voters have identical preferences but differential information. With voluntary voting, all equilibria involve sincere voting and positive participation. Thus, in contrast to situations with compulsory voting, there is no conflict between strategic and sincere behavior. When voting is costless, voluntary voting is welfare superior to compulsory voting. Even when voting is costly, participation rates are such that, in the limit, the correct candidate is elected-that is, information fully aggregates. Because it economizes on costs, voluntary voting is again welfare superior to compulsory voting.
AB - We compare voluntary and compulsory voting in a Condorcet-type model in which voters have identical preferences but differential information. With voluntary voting, all equilibria involve sincere voting and positive participation. Thus, in contrast to situations with compulsory voting, there is no conflict between strategic and sincere behavior. When voting is costless, voluntary voting is welfare superior to compulsory voting. Even when voting is costly, participation rates are such that, in the limit, the correct candidate is elected-that is, information fully aggregates. Because it economizes on costs, voluntary voting is again welfare superior to compulsory voting.
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U2 - 10.1016/j.jet.2012.09.006
DO - 10.1016/j.jet.2012.09.006
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84869129270
VL - 147
SP - 2083
EP - 2123
JO - Journal of Economic Theory
JF - Journal of Economic Theory
SN - 0022-0531
IS - 6
ER -