When do authoritarian rulers educate: Trade competition and human capital investment in Non-Democracies

Santiago López-Cariboni, Xun Cao

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

This paper explains variations in education spending among non-democracies, focusing on policy interdependence by trade competition. Facing pressures from spending changes in competitor countries, rulers calculate the costs and benefits associated with increased education spending: education increases labor productivity; it also increases civil engagement and chances of democratization. Therefore, we expect that rulers in countries whose revenues depend less on a productive labor force and those with shorter time horizons are less likely to invest because of lower expected benefits; rulers with single-party regimes, authoritarian legislatures, and especially partisan authoritarian legislatures are more likely to invest because such institutions enable them to better survive the threats associated with increased human capital. We find empirical support for policy interdependence and the conditional effects of government revenue source, time horizon, and partisan legislatures.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)367-405
Number of pages39
JournalReview of International Organizations
Volume14
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Sep 15 2019

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capital investment
human capital
democracy
interdependence
government revenue
education
labor productivity
labor force
democratization
revenue
regime
threat
costs
Human capital investment
Legislatures
Democracy
time
Time horizon
Interdependence
Education spending

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Political Science and International Relations

Cite this

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When do authoritarian rulers educate : Trade competition and human capital investment in Non-Democracies. / López-Cariboni, Santiago; Cao, Xun.

In: Review of International Organizations, Vol. 14, No. 3, 15.09.2019, p. 367-405.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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