Why invest in wind energy? Career incentives and chinese renewable energy politics

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

9 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We study wind development at the provincial level in China, modelling installed wind capacities as a function of both economics and politics. We assume that the top provincial officials desire to maximize their chances of promotion under the Chinese cadre evaluation system. We expect that those with the strongest incentives to perform in order to achieve promotion would work harder to comply with the central government's policy agenda to promote renewable energy. Collecting and testing data on provincial leaders’ characteristics, we find that provinces governed by party secretaries who were approaching the age of 65 are associated with significantly higher level of wind installed capacities. This result supports the political tournaments theory of Chinese politics. We also find that better educated party secretaries are likely to be more supportive of renewable energy, implying that education acts to encourage provincial leaders to support the central government's policy.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)120-131
Number of pages12
JournalEnergy Policy
Volume99
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 1 2016

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Wind power
incentive
politics
political theory
energy
Education
education
Economics
Testing
economics
modeling
central government
government policy
evaluation
province

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Energy(all)
  • Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law

Cite this

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title = "Why invest in wind energy? Career incentives and chinese renewable energy politics",
abstract = "We study wind development at the provincial level in China, modelling installed wind capacities as a function of both economics and politics. We assume that the top provincial officials desire to maximize their chances of promotion under the Chinese cadre evaluation system. We expect that those with the strongest incentives to perform in order to achieve promotion would work harder to comply with the central government's policy agenda to promote renewable energy. Collecting and testing data on provincial leaders’ characteristics, we find that provinces governed by party secretaries who were approaching the age of 65 are associated with significantly higher level of wind installed capacities. This result supports the political tournaments theory of Chinese politics. We also find that better educated party secretaries are likely to be more supportive of renewable energy, implying that education acts to encourage provincial leaders to support the central government's policy.",
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Why invest in wind energy? Career incentives and chinese renewable energy politics. / Cao, Xun; Kleit, Andrew Nathan; Liu, Chuyu.

In: Energy Policy, Vol. 99, 01.12.2016, p. 120-131.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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